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NOTES
TYRRELL WILLIAMS, whose annotations to the Restatement of the
Law of Contracts of the American Law Institute are con-
tinued in this issue, is Professor of Law at Washington
University. An Introductory Note explaining the author-
ship of the restatement itself and the assumption of re-
sponsibility by the Missouri Bar Association for the prepa-
ration of annotations was included in the preceding in-
stalment.
SAMUEL BRECKENRIDGE NOTE PRIZE AWARDS
The Samuel Breckenridge prize of fifteen dollars for the best
note in the issue of June, 1930, of THE LAW REVIEW has been
awarded to Robert J. Harding for his note on Franchise Taxes
of Corporations Having Stock Without Par Value. The ten-
dollar prize for the best note of 1929-30, has been awarded to
Wallace V. Wilson for his note entitled Recent Developments in
State Taxation of Intangibles, which previously received a prize
as the best note in the issue of April, 1930. The committee of
members of the bar which awarded the prizes for volume 15 con-
sisted of Messrs. Adolph M. Hoenny, Maurice L. Stewart, and
Monroe Oppenheimer.
Notes
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS UNDER BLUE SKY LAWS
Since the first Blue Sky Law was passed in Kansas in 19111
almost every state in the union has passed laws of a similar
nature. 2 There are, however, several distinct types of statutes,
which may be classified as (1) fraud acts, under which the at-
torney-general is given power to investigate the securities sold
by dealers; (2) regulatory acts without control of dealers, under
which the administrative board has surveillance of all securities
registered for sale in the state; (3) dealer licensing acts, which
operate on the theory that the regulation of the sellers of securi-
ties is the best mode of protecting the public; (4) acts requiring
'Wham, Rights Under Blue Sky Laws (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 310.
"'All of the states have acts regulating the sale of securities but there
are wide variations between the statutes in different states. In three states
the acts provide only for the enjoining of the sale of fraudulent securities,
and in two states only for the licensing of brokers and salesmen. In other
states the principle of licensing security issues is adopted." Commissioners'
Prefatory Note, Uniform Sale of Securities Act (1929). See also Mo. Laws(1929) p. 387; Ill. Laws (1929) p. 684; Okla. Comp. Stat. (Bunn, 1921)
sec. 2270; Ark. Stat. (Castle's Supp., 1927) sec. 8418d.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
specific approval of securities issues, with preferential position
to non-speculative securities, accompanied by dealer control; and
(5) similar acts without preferences to non-speculative issues.0
All except the first type are preventive in character, either
licensing dealers, or registering and approving securities issues,
or both. It is to be noted that in all cases herein considered ex-
cept a Pennsylvania case the statutes under which the actions
were brought provided for the regulation of both dealers and
securities issues. But it has been stated that under similar statutes
there are wide variances in actual administration of state securi-
ties departments. 4
It is the purpose of this article to examine the powers of the
administrative officials under the Blue Sky Laws in the licensing
of securities and dealers. Despite the fact that there has been
much litigation in the short time since these laws have been
passed, there has been very little in regard to the methods of ad-
ministration. It is only in some half dozen states that the mode
of exercise of the administrative officers' power has been ques-
tioned directly. No doubt in suits between private parties
courts have at other times, as dicta, casually referred to the scope
of such power. However, this article will be limited to cases in
which the extent of administrative authority under the Blue
Sky Laws has been the point in issue. Approximately half of
the litigation on this matter has occurred in California, which
apparently indicates great diligence on the part of the California
officials in the performance of their duties.
The first question to be considered is the discretion of the com-
missioner in granting licenses to sell securities. Justice Mc-
Kenna, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States interpreting an Ohio statute, said that the com-
missioner was "to be satisfied of the good repute in business of
such applicants and named agents. . . . It is especially objected
that as to these requirements no standard is given to guide or
determine the decision of the commissioner. Discretion thus
vested in commissioner leaves room for the play of arbitrary
power. . . It is certainly apparent that if the conditions are
within the power of the state to impose, they can only be ascer-
tained by an executive officer. Reputation and character are
quite tangible attributes, but there can be no legislative definition
of them that can automatically attach to or identify individuals
possessing them, and necessarily the aid of some executive
agency must be invoked." Thus at a comparatively early date
'Dalton, The California Corporate Securities Act (1930) 18 CAL. L. REV.
115.
'Ibid.
'Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 539.
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the United States Supreme Court adopted a liberal attitude in
approving a very wide discretion in the commissioner.
In an early California case, Doble Steam Motors Corp. v.
Daugherty,6 where the agent of a corporation had taken part
payment for subscriptions for more than the authorized issue of
stock and had become bankrupt, and the corporation sought a
permit to issue additional securities to the purchasers despite
the fact that the full amount would not be realized from their
sale, it was held within the discretion of the commissioner to de-
termine whether the illegal subscriptions should be ratified and
hence whether the loss should fall upon the subscribers or upon
the corporation. This is one of the first of a series of cases in-
volving the California securities commissioner in which the
courts have almost uniformly upheld his decisions. In this case
his powers are defined as follows: "Discretion is reposed in the
commissioner to grant or to deny a permit to a corporation to
issue and sell any particular portion of its capital stock whenever
. . . there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion as to
whether the proposed plan of the applicant for the issuance of
securities and the proposed methods to be used by it in issuing
or disposing of them will be fair or unfair, just or unjust, equitable
or inequitable; and as to whether their issuance and disposition
upon the proposed plan of business of the applicant will or will not
work a fraud upon the purchasers of such securities. ' 7 Here, also,
the commissioner was held to have the discretion to require the cor-
poration to put itself on a substantial production basis before
allowing the registration of a new issue of securities. The court
added that he might also require a corporation to purchase
patent rights which he deemed essential to the business, and to
pay royalties out of net profits only.,
In a later case a petition for certiorari to review the action of
the securities commissioner in refusing to register a second issue
of securities was denied. "It will not do to say in such a pro-
ceeding as this that the commissioner may not refuse later per-
mits, after granting the first one made, unless conditions affect-
ing the disposition of the first application have later changed.
It is for the commissioner to determine whether the conditions
have changed. If he reaches an incorrect conclusion on that
matter, it is obvious to us that his determination is merely error,
and not in excess of his jurisdiction."' 9 This illustrates the Cali-
fornia stand that the only check on the commissioner will be in
the event of the abuse of his discretion by going outside of his
* (1924) 195 Cal. 158, 232 Pac. 140.
'Ibid.
'Ibid.
* Pacific Home Bldg. Co. v. Daugherty (1926) 75 Cal. App. 623, 243 Pac.
473.
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jurisdiction. A similar result was reached where the commis-
sioner issued an order permitting the sale of stock of a corpora-
tion only on return of certificates illegally sold. The court held
that this was not clearly an abuse of discretion because of the
possible liability to holders of the illegally issued stock.10
A review of the cases just cited shows that the California
securities commissioner, before registering security issues of
both domestic and foreign corporations, may make a thorough
investigation of the business structure of the companies. He
may decide whether a proposed plan of business is fair or unfair
and may order the corporation to perform certain acts which he
deems necessary to the proper conduct of its affairs before
issuing the permit.
In considering the powers of commissions in other jurisdic-
tions, we find almost the same rule obtains as to the investigation
of the corporate plan of business. Thus the Kansas court said:
". . it devolves upon the board to inquire as to the solvency
and responsibility of the plaintiff, the sufficiency of its assets,
the trustworthiness of those representing and managing it, the
fairness, honesty, and equity of its plan, the security afforded in-
vestors that its funds will not be dissipated or misappropriated
". In a Michigan case promoters were denied permission
to sell bonds for which the public was to pay in installments.
There was no security except the amounts paid in. The statute
provided for the refusal of licenses "where it appears to the
commission that the sale of such securities would work a fraud,
deception or imposition on the purchasers or the public, or that
the proposed disposal of securities is on unfair terms." The
court said it did not understand that it was imperative for the
commission to find the promoters of the project guilty of in-
tentional dishonesty or active fraud; all that was necessary was
a potential fraud or imposition on the public. 12
'- Basalt Rock Co. v. McMillan (1926) 80 Cal. App. 147, 251 Pac. 322. A
similar case was Hayden Plan Co. v. Friedlander (1929) 97 Cal. App. 12,
275 Pac. 253, where it was held that the corporation commissioner had dis-
cretion to deny a permit to a foreign corporation to sell an issue of cer-
tificates where the application therefor showed that the certificates were
not negotiable or transferable without the corporation's consent, that funds
obtained by the corporation could be invested in any state in the union and
its assets thus removed from the control of local authority, and that the
investor had no means of surrendering his certificate and securing the re-
turn of his principal or any portion thereof.
IHome Lumber Co. v. State Charter Board (1920) 107 Kan. 153, 190
Pac. 601.
'Investment Reserve Corp. v. Mich. Securities Com. (1927) 238 Mich.
606, 214 N. W. 311; State v. Dept. of Commerce (1928) 174 Minn. 200, 219
N. W. 81.
The Uniform Sale of Securities Act (1929) sec. 8, provides: "If upon
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol16/iss2/4
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A recent Pennsylvania case, which is to be distinguished from
the others because the statute provided only for the regulation
of dealers, imposed a serious restriction upon the power of the
commission to investigate the plan of business of a firm before
allowing it to sell securities. An investment trust sought to sell
its own certificates issued under a plan which, although not
actually fraudulent, was deceptive to the public. The commis-
sion refused the license; but the court held that the statute was
intended to regulate dealers in securities rather than to license
the securities themselves, and therefore the commission had no
power to review the plan of business of the firm, and was limited
to a consideration of whether the securities were offered "hon-
estly and in good faith." 13
An opposite view of the extent of the commissioner's power to
investigate the corporate structure was taken in Dominguez
Land Corp. v. Daugherty.4 It is to be noted that this was not a
question of the granting of a permit to issue securities, but a
proceeding in mandamus to compel the commissioner to consider
and act upon the petitioner's application to distribute surplus
to its stockholders. The court said: "The leading idea which
seems to run through the Corporate Securities Act is that in all
cases the commissioner is to consider whether the act which he is
asked to sanction-the making of dividends from other than
surplus profits, for example-will leave the corporation in a safe
financial condition. . . .We believe it to be a sufficient standard
for an adequate guard against arbitrary action." The court goes
on to say that the commissioner is to determine by an examina-
tion of witnesses and the books and records of the corporation
whether if the dividends be paid the corporation will remain in
a safe financial condition. It declares this to be a ministerial or
administrative, rather than a judicial function. This decision
is in marked contrast to the Pennsylvania holding in showing the
extreme scope of powers and duties of the commissioner in ex-
amining the corporate structure under the California act.
A commission is not limited to jury trial rules of evidence.-
Its findings of fact are generally conclusive; and its decision will
be disturbed only if it is oppressive and arbitrary, 6 or where it
examination of any application the [Commissioner] [Commission] shall find
that the sale of the security referred to therein would not be fraudulent
and would not work or tend to work a fraud upon the purchaser, and that
the enterprise or business of the issuer is not based upon unsound business
principles, he shall record the registration of such security..."
'Insuranshares Corp. v. Pa. Securities Com. (1925) 282 Pa. 84, 127 Atl.311.31 (1925) 196 Cal. 453, 238 Pac. 697.
"Investment Reserve Corp. v. Mich. Securities Com., supra n. 12.
State v. Dept. of Commerce, supra n. 12.
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exceeds its jurisdiction or makes a finding completely unsup-
ported by the evidence.7 One case held that the commissioner
was not liable to purchasers for his negligence in permitting the
issuance of unsound securities. The statute, which was complied
with, required the following words on securities: "The commis-
sioner does not recommend the purchase of this security," print-
ed in type two sizes larger than any other part of the certificates.
On this ground the majority of the court held the commissioner
not liable. In a terse dissent, Cothran, J., said: "While the
license by the commissioner does not amount to a recommenda-
tion of the stock, it certainly is an assurance that the commis-
sioner has at least exercised ordinary care in performing the
duties imposed on him by the statute . . . the complaint pre-
sented issues for a jury."' 8 The majority opinion indicates that
the commissioner should have great latitude in making his de-
cisions; the minority view is based upon the feeling that his
duties will be more thoroughly performed if a penalty is placed
upon his failure to perform them reasonably .well.
Besides regulating the issuance of securities through require-
ments for their registration, the commission under most Blue
Sky Laws takes charge of the licensing of brokers to deal in
securities and the revocation of permits already granted. Where
a broker was refused a renewal of license, an allegation that the
commissioner was without jurisdiction to determine the ques-
tion of the petitioner's good reputation, since the citation con-
tained no direct charge or complaint against him, was without
merit, since his right to engage in business as a broker for the
succeeding year was not vested, but was wholly contingent on
the quasi-judicial determination of the commissioner. The court
said: "Not only the question of whether or not any further in-
vestigation or examination shall be had, but as well, in the event
that such investigation or examination should be instituted, its
nature and extent are apparently left to the corporation commis-
sioner." Further, "his finding of fact based upon evidence, is
conclusive" on the courts.1 9
The procedure in revocation of brokers' licenses is fairly well
settled. ". . . even in the absence of any provision in the statute,
a broker is entitled to a notice and hearing before the commis-
sioner can revoke his license. . . . A 'finding' of the existence of
certain facts presupposes some hearing of evidence tending to
prove such fact*." 20 The type of notice required depends largely
upon the statute. Where three grounds of revocation were pro-
" See cases cited in n. 12, supra.
Minter v. McSwain (1923) 126 S. C. 37, 119 S. E. 901.
Leach v. Daugherty (1925) 73 Cal. App. 83, 238 Pac. 160.
'Abrams v. Daugherty (1922) 60 Cal. App. 297, 212 Pac. 942.
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vided-bad repute, violation of the act, and having committed or
intended to commit a fraudulent transaction-it was held that
the notice to the dealer must state the particular ground so that
he may know the facts upon which to base his defense. 21 But
where the statute provided for revocation for "good cause" the
Michigan court held that the term "relates so clearly to the con-
duct of the licensed business, within the limits fixed by law, as
to negative any arbitrary official action, and is so comprehensive
of irregular, fraudulent, unauthorized and forbidden business
management and transactions conducted as to demand no more
particular specification of its meaning and application.1 22
The findings of the commission in proceedings for revocation
of brokers' licenses are final, and even where a statutory review
is provided they will not be disturbed unless clearly contrary to
the overwhelming weight of the evidence.Y
It will be seen that the procedure in revoking licenses already
granted to brokers is somewhat more strict than that in issuing
licenses, demonstrating the habitual reluctance of the courts to
take away already acquired rights.
The power of the commission to suspend the licenses of dealers
pending proceedings for revocation is not clearly established. 2'
It seems apparent that this power should not be exercised arbi-
trarily or where there is no public need which demands more
prompt action than can be had under a revocation proceeding.
In Abrams v. Daugherty25 the court, in speaking of the power of
suspension, declared: "If we may assume that it is to be implied
from the grant of the power of revocation, it nevertheless may be
exercised only when the commissioner has obtained jurisdiction
to proceed with a hearing and determination of that question.
If this were not so, the commissioner could . . . order a tem-
porary suspension and continue the order indefinitely, thus de-
priving the broker of his right to do business without any
legal process whatever."
Permits of registration of securities may theoretically be re-
voked upon the same considerations which would have justified
a refusal by the commission to grant them.28 As a practical mat-
n Ibid
" Redmond & Co. v. Securities Com. (1923) 222 Mich. 1, 192 N. W. 688.
0 Ibid.
" The Uniform Sale of Securities Act (1929) sec. 12, provides: "Pending
the hearing the [Commissioner] [Connission] shall have the power to
order the suspension of such dealer's or salesman's registration; provided,
such order shall state the cause of such suspension."
"N. 20, supra.
The Uniform Sale of Securities Act (1929) sec. 10, provides: "The
[Commissioner] [Commission] may revoke the registration of any security
by entering an order to that effect, with [his] [its] finding in respect there-
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ter, however, it is probable that the commission would be more
hesitant to exercise a broad discretion in revoking a permit pre-
viously issued, and the courts more inclined to interfere with
such exercise of discretion, than in the case of an original denial
of a permit. A syndicate in Minnesota had issued ten-year
installment certificates with a surrender value, from the second
to the sixth year, less than the principal amounts paid. Large
numbers of purchasers, having failed to meet their payments
during this period, suffered losses. The securities commission,
empowered to withhold or suspend licenses where plans of busi-
ness were fraudulent or would work a fraud on purchasers, sus-
pended the syndicate's license. On certiorari the court held that
the fact an investment often proves imprudent is no ground
for revocation of the permit in the absence of fraud.27
In view of the fact that there has been so little litigation on
the extent of the administrative authorities' power under Blue
Sky Laws, it is futile to attempt to predict the applicable future
rules of judicial decision. It must be remembered that the pow-
ers will necessarily vary somewhat under the different types of
statutes. Nevertheless, the cases cited do show a marked atti-
tude on the part of the courts to leave the commissions a broad
discretion, in keeping with a growing policy in this country of
turning over the determination of rights to administrative bodies.
JEROME A. GROSS, '31, and RICHARD W. BROWN, '31.
SOME RECENT METHODS OF HARASSING THE
HABITUAL CRIMINAL
INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of organized crime in the larger cities of this
country, to a degree unheard of even a decade ago and un-
dreamed of even today in the cities of other civilized nations
throughout the world, is familiar to every reader of a metropoli-
tan newspaper. Particularly shocking is the condition which
to, if upon examination into the affairs of the issuer of such security it
shall appear that the issuer: (1) is insolvent; or (2) has violated any of
the provisions of this act or any order of the [Commissioner] [Commission]
of which such issuer has notice; or (3) has been or is engaged or is about
to engage in fraudulent transactions; or (4) is in any other way dishonest
or has made fraudulent representations in any prospectus or in any circular
or other literature that has been distributed concerning the issuer or its
securities; or (5) is of bad business repute; or (6) does not conduct its
business in accordance with law; or (7) that its affairs are in an unsound
condition; or (8) that the enterprise or business of the issuer or the se-
curity is not based upon sound business principles."
'In re Investors' Syndicate (1920) 147 Minn. 217, 174 N. W. 1001.
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